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Abstract In 2006, Gaurav Gupta and Josef Pieprzyk pre-
sented an attack on the branch-based software water-
marking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia
Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based
on replacing jump instructions or unconditional branch
statements (UBS) by calls to a ngerprint branch function
(FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS
as a function of the generated ngerprint and integrity
check. If the program is tampered with, the ngerprint
and/or integrity checks change and the target address
is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack
uses debugger capabilities such as register and address
lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to
manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the
FBF and calls to the same is identied, correct displacement
values are generated and calls to FBF are replaced by
the original UBS transferring controlof the attack to the
correct target instruction. In this paper, we propose a
watermarking model that provides security against such
debugging attacks. Two primary measures taken are shifting
the stack pointer modication operation from the FBF to the
individual UBSs, and coding the stack pointer modication
in the same language as that of the rest of the code rather
than assembly language to avoid conspicuous contents. The
manual component complexity increases from O(1) in the
previous scheme to O(n) in our proposed scheme.
Index Terms watermarking, ngerprint, software
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Software piracy and forgery have prompted researchers
to investigate watermarking and ngerprinting. The wa-
termark establishes author identity and the ngerprint
extracts the buyer's information. Many watermarking and
ngerprinting schemes have been proposed with these
objectives, and can be classied as follows:
• Graph-based software watermarking: Software can
be realized as a graph G where nodes of the graph are
represented by a sequential instruction set and edges
are the branch instructions that transfer control from
one instruction to another instruction. Represent a
node by ni = {si1 , . . . , siki } where ki is the number
of instructions in node ni. An edge ei,j represents a
branch instruction from ni to nj .
Watermark is contained in another independent pro-
gram, also represented by a graph G′. The purpose of
watermark embedder is to add G and G′ such that it
is computationally infeasible for the attacker to nd
the right cut that separates G,G′. The watermarked
software graph Gw = G+G′.
The rst graph-based software watermarking scheme
was proposed by Venkatesan et al. [1]. Software
and watermark codes are converted to digraphs and
extra edges are added between these two digraphs
by adding function calls. The authors propose to im-
plement a random walk for the selection of the next
node to be visited during the embedding process.
But this walk is not truly random. Let the next node
to be visited be n, nodes remaining in the software
be Ns and nodes remaining in the watermark be
Nw. P (n ∈ G′) = NwNw+Ns and P (n ∈ G) =
Ns
Nw+Ns
. Assuming Ns À Nw in the beginning,
there is a high probability that the nodes selected
towards the beginning belong to the software and
the nodes selected towards the end belong to the
watermark. Hence the watermark is skewed towards
the tail of the watermarked program. Other papers
in graph-based software watermarking are available
for readers' consideration in [2][6]. Instruction and
block re-ordering attacks remain to be a problem for
all these models.
• Register-based software watermarking: Watermark
is embedding in the order of the registers that are
used to store variables. Register-based software wa-
termarking based on the QP algorithm (named after
authors Qu and Potkonjak) [7], [8] is presented in
[9]. If two variables are required at the same time,
it does not matter which register stores which one
of the two variables. Thus the registers that store
the two variables can be swapped. The watermark
is encoded in the ordering of registers. Register re-
allocation is an obvious and direct attack against such
watermarking scheme. Secondary watermarking also
destroys the old watermark.
• Thread-based software watermarking: Just like they
are encoded in the ordering of registers in the pre-
vious case, watermarks are encoded in the ordering
of threads in this case [10]. If there are 2 threads;
Ta, Tb, Ta → Tb encodes watermark (00)2, Tb → Ta
encodes (01)2, Ta → Ta encodes (10)2 and Tb → Tb
encodes (11)2. The threads that execute program
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code can be manipulated by the attacker in a bid
to destroy the watermark.
• Obfuscation-based software watermarking: Object-
oriented programs can be watermarked using this wa-
termarking model [11][13]. Class C that performs n
functions {f1, . . . , fn} is divided into m subclasses
{C1, C2, . . . , Cm}. The watermark is encoded in
which subclasses contain which functions.
• Branch-based software watermarking: Unconditional
branch statements (UBS) are converted to function
calls to a special function called the branch function.
The purpose of branch function is to transfer the
control to the correct target address of the UBS [2].
A branch is represented as la → lb indicating a jump
from instruction la to instruction lb. If the program
contains lbegin → lend, the control-ow graph is
changed to lbegin → a1 → a2 → . . . → lend
by adding multiple intermediate instructions (lbegin
jumps to a1, a1 that jumps to a2 and so on). The
following condition is checked while inserting these
instructions.
If watermark bit wi = 1,
then address(ai+1) > address(ai),
otherwise address(ai+1) < address(ai)
Secondly the jump instructions are replaced by
branch function calls. The branch function deter-
mines the correct target address based on the calling
address.
If an attacker deletes one or more intermediate
instructions and/or adds his/her own bogus inter-
mediate instructions, the execution path is modied
thereby modifying the watermark bit-string that is
recovered.
To work around such problems and others, Myles
and Jin propose a ngerprinting scheme in [14].
The concept of a branch function transferring control
to the target of the UBS remains common to their
model, but their branch function generates the nger-
print, and is therefore called a Fingerprint Branch
Function (FBF). To verify that the attacker hasn't
modied the rest of the code, FBF can also check
for integrity of the code. Details of this scheme are
discussed the Section III.
II. REQUIREMENTS
This section describes requirements of a watermarking
scheme, general attacks on watermarked media and other
attacks specically against watermarked software. Any
software watermarking model should consider security
of the scheme against these attacks individually, and in
combination.
The requirements of a watermarking scheme are as
follows,
1) Imperceptibility: Watermark insertion should cause
minimum time and space overload on the software.
The scheme should also avoid watermark's explicit
storage inside the software.
2) Watermark detectability: The watermark should
be able to be detected with a probability 1 − ²
where, ideally speaking, ² ≈ 0. Probability of false
positives should also be negligible.
3) Robustness: Watermark should survive generic at-
tacks and those specic to software watermarks.
These attacks as listed below,
a) Additive Attack: Insertion of variables and
instructions to the watermarked software to
disturb the watermark encoding.
b) Subtractive Attack: Removal of (non-
essential) variables and code to probabilisti-
cally delete the watermark.
c) Secondary Watermarking Attack: Insertion
of attacker's own watermark in a bid to over-
write the original watermark. Security against
this attack is typically provided by the secret
key which generates location of watermark.
d) Decompilation-Recompilation Attack: This
attack is specic to software and recompiles
the software after decompiling it. Numerous
compilation-specic orderings are modied in
this manner.
e) Invertibility Attack: Attempting to detect
accidental presence of a watermark in the
software by trying random input sequences.
f) Code re-writing Attack: Parts of the code
may be re-written by the attacker to minimize
possibility of watermark being encoded in
language syntax.
g) Register renaming Attack: Renaming the
registers to destroy watermark encoded in reg-
ister ordering [7], [8].
III. MYLES AND JUN'S WATERMARKING SCHEME
Branch statements are replaced by calls to an FBF
which returns control to the target address. Each time the
FBF is called, it calculates a secret key used to generate
the target address. This key is calculated using a hash
function of the old key (key derived in the previous stage),
the authorship mark, and the integrity check on some
section of the code (a different section during each stage).
An integrity check branch function (ICBF) is appended
to the program to ensure that the attacker doesn't modify
the FBF. When a watermarked program is manipulated,
the generated keys and/or integrity check values change
and hence the target address is incorrectly calculated. The
program behaves in manner dependent on the resulting
target address - if the target address belongs to the code
section, program continues to execute but incorrectly and
if the target address lies outside the code section (say
the data section), the program returns with a run-time
error. The watermarking model can be seen as a system
comprising of two algorithms - embed and recognize.
• P → original software,
• AM → authorship mark,
• keyAM → secret input sequence,
• keyFP → initial secret key,
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Figure 1. Fingerprint branch function changes the return address based on calling address and transfers control to the target instruction of the
original unconditional branch statement. Unconditional branch statements are then replaced by calls to FBF .
• FP → ngerprint,
• Pw → watermarked software
1) embed(P,AM, keyAM , keyFP )→ Pw, FP
2) recognize(Pw, keyAM , keyFP )→ AM,FP
The embed algorithm is explained below,
1) Let F be the set of functions that lie in the execution
path when the program is run with input sequence
keyAM , let F¯ be the set of the remaining functions
in P .
2) Let the number of unconditional branch statements
in functions in F and F¯ be n and m respectively.
3) Add two arrays to the data section of the program
- DTF of size n and DTF¯ of size m.
4) Let the displacement between the source and tar-
get of the ith unconditional branch statements in
functions from F be di = ti − si, where si is the
source/origin and ti is the target/destination of the
UBS.
5) In P , insert ngerprint branch function FBF which
implements the following steps,
a) k0 = keyFP .
b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
i) Check integrity value ICi of code section
Si.
ii) Generate ki using ki−1, ICi, AM from the
one-way hash function SHA1
ki = SHA1[(ki−1
⊕
AM)‖ICi] (1)
c) DTF [h1(ki)] = di, where h1 is a hash func-
tion mapping the keys to the indices, h1 :
{k1, k2, . . . , kn} → {1, 2, . . . , n˜}(n ≤ n˜).
6) Let the displacement between the source and target
of ith unconditional branch statements in functions
from F¯ be d¯i = t¯i−s¯i, where s¯i is the source/origin
and t¯i is the target/destination of the UBS.
7) Insert integrity check branch function ICBF in P
that performs following steps,
a) Compute integrity check value IC′i for code
containing FBF .
b) DTF¯ [h2(IC′i)] = d¯i, where h2 is a hash
function mapping the integrity checks to the
indices, h2 : {IC′1, IC′2, . . . , IC′m} →
{1, 2, . . . , m˜}(m ≤ m˜).
8) Replace unconditional branch statements in F and
F¯ by calls to FBF and ICBF respectively.
The ngerprint is a concatenation of generated keys.
FP = k1‖k2‖ . . . ‖kn (2)
Since each user has a distinct initial key keyFM ,
each user also has a distinct ngerprint. Thus the embed
algorithm satises the basic condition of a ngerprint that
no two users should have the same ngerprint.
The watermarked program Pw, secret input keyAM and
the initializing key keyFP are provided to the recognize
algorithm which returns the authorship mark AM and
ngerprint FP . Running Pw with input sequence keyAM
executes functions in F generating the ngerprint FP =
k1‖k2‖ . . . kn (initializing k0 = keyFP ) using Equation 4.
AM is recovered from the one-way hash function ki =
SHA1[(ki−1
⊕
AM)‖ICi].
IV. GUPTA AND PIEPRZYK'S DEBUGGING ATTACK
In 2006, Gupta and Pieprzyk presented an attack on
Myles and Jun's watermarking scheme [15]. Major por-
tion of this attack is automated and manual inspection is
kept to a minimal making it an extremely practical attack.
In this section, this attack is described in detail.
The attacker's goal is to restore the original program
P from the ngerprinted program Pw. The transfer of
control from source to target of an unconditional branch
statement is through FBF . Inside FBF , the displacement
added to/subtracted from the source address is calculated
as a hash of the generated key. This key itself is calculated
using the previous stage's key, authorship mark and an
integrity check value. If any one of these values are
wrong, the new key, and thereby the displacement is
incorrect which results in FBF returning control to the
wrong instruction. ICBF veries the integrity of FBF ,
providing a second layer of security.
Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack targets the dependence of
target address on key generated. If the execution path can
be made independent of the keys generated, FBF and
ICBF can be deleted. Gupta and Pieprzyk propose to
track register values, including the stack pointer (SP) at:
1) Entry point of FBF : SP = spi1
2) Exit/ Return instruction of FBF : SP = spi2
Displacement value di is given by the difference spi2−
spi1 . Identifying instructions participating in ngerprint
generation is also achievable. The attacker can create a
mapping of functions being called by other functions
and thereby create sets of functions which all point to
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Figure 2. The set F of functions is executed when the program P is executed with the input keyAM . Effectively, keyAM generates a trace of the
program P .
one particular function. FBF is identiable by short-
listing stack-pointer modifying functions and presence of
assembly level code in the program. The set F is the set
of functions that call FBF . Since keyAM is not needed to
identify the set of functions participating in watermarking,
Gupta and Pieprzyk eliminate the requirement of keyAM .
In functions belonging to F , an instruction calling FBF
is now replaced by an unconditional branch to the instruc-
tion to which FBF would return control.
After changing FBF and ICBF calls by unconditional
branch statements to the correct target instruction, the two
functions (FBF , ICBF ) are deleted. When the recognize
algorithm is run with input keyAM , keyFP , the inputs
are unused dead variables, the algorithm doesn't output
the ngerprint FP and the recognition algorithm fails.
The resulting software is equivalent to an un-watermarked
software.
The attacker may be interested in superimposing his/her
own watermark after deleting the original watermark. To
achieve this purpose, (s)he can insert a new ngerprint
branch function that outputs the attacker's authorship
mark when the program is executed with keyAM .
Summarizing the process, the steps performed by the
attacker are:
1) Locate FBF : This is achieved through the follow-
ing characteristics of FBF ,
a) Presence of assembly level code (For example
asm blocks in C and C++.
b) Mismatched values of Stack Pointer at entry
and exit of the function.
2) Locate F : Only functions in F call FBF and hence
locating them is a trivial task once FBF is located.
3) Computing displacements: Values of stack pointer
at the rst and the last statement in FBF ; spi1 and
spi2 respectively; is noted. Displacement di is the
difference of these two values (spi2 − spi1).
4) Replacing FBF calls to unconditional branch
statements: The correct target instruction can be
located using the source instruction and the dis-
placement.
5) Deleting FBF and ICBF : Locating ICBF is
similar to locating FBF . Then, both these functions
are deleted.
6) Creating a modied watermarked program: The
attacker may want to embed his/her own au-
thorship mark ˜AM . For this to be effec-
tive, recognize(P˜ , keyFP , keyAM ) should return
˜AM, F˜P ) as output where P˜ is the attacked and
modied program and F˜P 6= FP . Following steps
illustrate the process of secondary watermarking.
a) For all unconditional branch statements for
all functions in F , store the displacements
(between the calling address and the target
address) in an two-dimensional array D along
with the calling address.
b) Replace the unconditional branch statements
by call to a new ngerprint branch function,
F˜BF .
c) F˜BF need not generates a key based on the
previous key and attacker's authorship mark
˜AM .
k˜i = SHA1[k˜i−1
⊕
˜AM ]. (3)
Note that the generation of new keys no
longer requires the attacker to compute in-
tegrity check.
d) A hash function h maps the keys to the
correct displacements, h : {k˜1, k˜2, . . . , k˜n} →
{1, 2, . . . ,m}(n ≤ m). The table T˜ storing
the correct displacements is inserted in the
data section of the program.
T˜ [h(k˜i)] = di
Fingerprint F˜P generated is different from the original
key sequence FP as the individual keys are different.
Proof: k˜i 6= ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
⇒ {k˜1, k˜2, . . . , k˜n} 6= {k1, k2, . . . , kn}
⇒ {k˜1, k˜2, . . . , k˜n} 6= FP
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⇒ F˜P 6= FP
Algorithm recognize(P˜ , keyFP , keyAM ) will output
F˜P , ˜AM upon execution establishing the attacker's own-
ership over the software.
V. SURVIVING THE DEBUGGING ATTACK
In this section, we analyze the debugging attack dis-
cussed in the previous section and identify the assump-
tions on which the attack is based. Further, we shall
propose way(s) to counter-attack these assumptions and
thus secure the software from any attempts of removing
or modifying the watermark.
The basic assumption we take is that the source code
is available to the attacker for inspection. This is a strong
assumption taking into account that most commercial
softwares do not come with the source codes. However,
we take into consideration the growing popularity of
open source software as well. Plus, having a stronger
assumption and thereby an easier attack, our watermark-
ing scheme results in getting stronger (if it can survive
the attacks). Manual inspection of the source code is
practically infeasible, given that it can run into hundreds
of thousands of code lines. Thus the attacker tries to
minimize the size of source code that (s)he manually
inspects. Debugging mechanisms provide strength to the
attacks in such cases by reducing the size of code to be
inspected to potentially a few hundred lines. According
to Gupta and Pieprzyk [15], in order to identify FBF ,
the attacker relies on either,
1) FBF containing assembly level code,
2) Stack Pointer value differing at entry and exit of
FBF .
We have a typical scenario where a source instruction
Is needs to transfer control to a target instruction It.
Is calls FBF which manipulates the stack pointer and
returns the control to It. Addressing the rst indicator,
the code that performs stack pointer modications can
always be written in a higher language and thus it is not
necessary that FBF contains assembly level code.
The stack pointer modication in FBF is the basis of
Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack. If FBF does not perform
this extremely visible and conspicuous stack pointer mod-
ication and only returns the value of generated key to Is,
then Is can add compute the displacement, add it to the
stack pointer and transfer control to It. Given this process,
the attack FBF cannot be identied and all subsequent
steps of the attack fail. Another advantage is that the
attacker can no longer get the values of all displacement
values by placing two breakpoints at the start and end of
FBF (which is the case in [14]). We can achieve this
task by shifting the stack pointer modication instruction
from FBF to function containing Is.
To get the values of displacements in the new model,
the attacker would need to place breakpoints before and
after each source instruction Is. In the previous model, the
attacker would have had to place only two breakpoints;
at the start and end of FBF irrespective of the number
of unconditional branch statements, and thus the amount
of work attacker had to do was independent of code
size. But now the amount of work attacker needs to
perform manually is directly proportional to the number
of unconditional branch statements present in functions
from F .
Another strong assumption in Gupta and Pieprzyk's
attack is that only unconditional branch statements in
functions belonging to F call FBF . If certain bogus calls
to FBF are inserted while embedding the watermark, this
assumption in not true. Thus identifying F is not possible
for the attacker through methods pointed out by Gupta and
Pieprzyk. The action taken by FBF when called by these
bogus statements is pre-dened during embedding.
The modied algorithm embed2 is given below,
1) Let F be the set of functions that lie in the execution
path when the program is run with input sequence
keyAM , let F¯ be the set of the remaining functions
in P .
2) Let the number of unconditional branch statements
in functions in F and F¯ be n and m respectively.
3) Add two arrays to the data section of the program
- DTF of size n and DTF¯ of size m.
4) Let the displacement between the source and tar-
get of the ith unconditional branch statements in
functions from F be di = ti − si, where si is the
source/origin and ti is the target/destination.
5) In P , insert ngerprint branch function FBF which
implements the following steps,
a) k0 = keyFP .
b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
i) Check integrity value ICi of section Si of
code.
ii) Generate ki using ki−1, ICi, AM from the
one-way hash function SHA1.
ki = SHA1[(ki−1
⊕
AM)‖ICi] (4)
6) Return ki to the calling instruction Is.
7) Is looks up the displacement that is indexed by hash
of the key and stored in table DTF in data section
of the program. DTF [h1(ki)] = di, where h1 is
a hash function mapping the keys to the indices,
h1 : {k1, k2, . . . , kn} → {1, 2, . . . , n˜}(n ≤ n˜).
8) Is transfers control to sp+di where sp is the current
value of stack pointer, using higher language code.
9) Insert integrity check branch function ICBF in P
that checks integrity IC′i of code containing FBF
10) Return IC′i to the calling instruction I¯s.
11) I¯s looks up the displacement that is indexed by
hash of the key and stored in table DTF¯ in data
section of the program. DTF¯ [h2(IC′i)] = d¯i, where
h2 is a hash function mapping the integrity checks
to the indices, h2 : {IC′1, IC′2, . . . , IC′m} →
{1, 2, . . . , m˜}(m ≤ m˜).
12) I¯s transfers control to sp+di where sp is the current
value of stack pointer, using higher language code.
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13) Replace unconditional branch statements in F and
F¯ by calls to FBF and ICBF respectively.
Steps 68 and 1012 are modied such that the control
transfer is shifted from FBF and ICBF to F and F¯
respectively.
VI. ANALYSIS
There are two primary modications to the watermark-
ing algorithm of Myles and Jun,
1) Strict usage of higher language code to perform
stack pointer modications.
2) Shifting the stack pointer modication from the
ngerprint branch function FBF to the source
instruction of the unconditional branch statement.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the differences between the
watermarking scheme of Myles and Jun and our proposed
scheme. While in the former, FBF performs the key,
displacement and target address computation, in the latter
scheme it only performs key computation and returns the
value of the key to the source instruction. The source
instruction then computes target address as a function of
displacement, which in turn is computed from the key.
Thus an attacker has to place n pairs of breakpoints to
nd the correct target addresses. Thus, manual component
complexity increases from O(1) in the previous scheme
to O(n) in our proposed scheme. Security against other
attacks such as additive or subtractive attacks remains the
same as in [14].
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. Compute Key
t1(target 1) Displacement
. Target
sn(source n) .
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Figure 3. In the previous scheme by Myles and Jun, source instruction
calls the ngerprint branch function which computes the key, displace-
ment and target address, in that order, and returns the control to the
target instruction
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented modications on [14]
so that the watermarking scheme can withstand debugging
attacks like the one suggested in [15]. The attacker needs
much more extensive manual inspection (Ø(n)) of the
watermarked program in order to remove the watermark.
This can prove to be infeasible given that software sizes
can easily run into thousands of lines of code. The key to
surviving the attack is shifting the stack pointer manip-
ulation operation from the ngerprint branch function to
the original unconditional branch statements.
The proposed watermarking scheme makes it more
difcult and more tedious for an attacker to locate manip-
ulative functions such as FBF , ICBF but does not rule
out eventual location and deletion of these functions. It is
desirable to formulate a watermarking scheme belonging
to the family of stack modifying functions that is com-
pletely secure against debugging attacks. To accomplish
this task, one needs to hide the dependency of target
instruction calculation on key generation process from the
user. This is an open problem in the eld of branch based
software watermarking.
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